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what it is like to be a bat nagel

1974 paper by American philosopher Thomas Nagel

Thomas Nagel argues that while a human might exist able to imagine what it is like to be a bat by taking "the bat'south bespeak of view", it would however be incommunicable "to know what it is similar for a bat to exist a bat." (Townsend's big-eared bat pictured).

"What Is It Similar to Be a Bat?" is a newspaper by American philosopher Thomas Nagel, offset published in The Philosophical Review in October 1974, and later in Nagel'south Mortal Questions (1979). The paper presents several difficulties posed by consciousness, including the possible insolubility of the mind-trunk trouble owing to "facts beyond the attain of human concepts", the limits of objectivity and reductionism, the "phenomenological features" of subjective experience, the limits of homo imagination, and what it means to be a particular, conscious thing.[1]

Nagel famously asserts that "an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism."[2] This assertion has achieved special status in consciousness studies as "the standard 'what information technology's like' locution."[three] Daniel Dennett, while sharply disagreeing on some points, acknowledged Nagel's newspaper as "the most widely cited and influential thought experiment about consciousness."[4] : 441

Thesis [edit]

Nagel challenges the possibility of explaining "the well-nigh of import and characteristic feature of conscious mental phenomena" by reductive materialism (the philosophical position that all statements near the mind and mental states tin exist translated, without any loss or alter in meaning, into statements about the physical). For case, a reductive physicalist's solution to the mind–torso problem holds that whatever "consciousness" is, it can be fully described via physical processes in the brain and body.[5]

Nagel begins by assuming that "conscious experience is a widespread phenomenon" present in many animals (especially mammals), even though it is "difficult to say [...] what provides evidence of it." Thus, Nagel sees consciousness not as something exclusively human, only every bit something shared by many, if not all, organisms. Nagel must be speaking of something other than sensory perception, since objective facts and widespread evidence prove that organisms with sensory organs have biological processes of sensory perception. In fact, what all organisms share, co-ordinate to Nagel, is what he calls the "subjective character of experience" defined equally follows: "An organism has witting mental states if and but if at that place is something that it is like to be that organism – something that it is like for the organism."[1]

The paper argues that the subjective nature of consciousness undermines whatever attempt to explain consciousness via objective, reductionist ways. The subjective graphic symbol of experience cannot be explained by a system of functional or intentional states. Consciousness cannot be fully explained if the subjective character of experience is ignored, and the subjective character of feel cannot be explained past a reductionist; it is a mental miracle that cannot be reduced to materialism.[six] Thus, for consciousness to be explained from a reductionist stance, the idea of the subjective character of experience would take to exist discarded, which is absurd. Neither can a physicalist view, considering in such a earth each phenomenal experience had past a conscious beingness would have to have a physical property attributed to information technology, which is impossible to testify due to the subjectivity of conscious feel. Nagel argues that each and every subjective experience is connected with a "single point of view", making it infeasible to consider any conscious experience as "objective".

Nagel uses the metaphor of bats to clarify the stardom between subjective and objective concepts. Because bats are mammals, they are assumed to have conscious experience. Nagel was inspired to use a bat for his statement later living in a dwelling house where the animals were frequent visitors. Nagel ultimately used bats for his argument because of their highly evolved and active use of a biological sensory apparatus that is significantly different from that of many other organisms. Bats use echolocation to navigate and perceive objects. This method of perception is similar to the human sense of vision. Both sonar and vision are regarded every bit perceptual experiences. While it is possible to imagine what information technology would be similar to fly, navigate past sonar, hang upside downwardly and eat insects like a bat, that is not the same as a bat'due south perspective. Nagel claims that even if humans were able to metamorphose gradually into bats, their brains would non take been wired as a bat's from nascence; therefore, they would only exist able to feel the life and behaviors of a bat, rather than the mindset.[7]

Such is the difference betwixt subjective and objective points of view. According to Nagel, "our ain mental activity is the only unquestionable fact of our experience", significant that each individual only knows what it is like to be them (subjectivism). Objectivity requires an unbiased, non-subjective state of perception. For Nagel, the objective perspective is not feasible, because humans are limited to subjective experience.

Nagel concludes with the contention that it would exist incorrect to assume that physicalism is incorrect, since that position is also imperfectly understood. Physicalism claims that states and events are physical, but those concrete states and events are simply imperfectly characterized. All the same, he holds that physicalism cannot be understood without characterizing objective and subjective experience. That is a necessary precondition for agreement the heed-body problem.

Criticisms [edit]

Daniel Dennett denies Nagel's claim that the bat'due south consciousness is inaccessible, contending that whatsoever "interesting or theoretically important" features of a bat's consciousness would be acquiescent to 3rd-person observation.[4] : 442 For example, it is articulate that bats cannot detect objects more than a few meters away because echolocation has a limited range. Dennett holds that any similar aspects of its experiences could exist gleaned by further scientific experiments.[iv] : 443 Kathleen Akins similarly argued that many questions nigh a bat'south subjective experience hinge on unanswered questions about the neuroscientific details of a bat's brain (such as the office of cortical activity profiles), and Nagel is too quick in ruling these out every bit answers to his central question.[eight] [9]

Peter Hacker analyzes Nagel's statement as not only "malconstructed" simply philosophically "misconceived" as a definition of consciousness,[ten] and he asserts that Nagel's newspaper "laid the groundwork for…forty years of fresh defoliation about consciousness."[11] : 13

Eric Schwitzgebel and Michael S. Gordon have argued that, opposite to Nagel, normal sighted humans practice use echolocation much like bats - it is merely that information technology is generally done without ane's awareness. They employ this to argue that normal people in normal circumstances can exist grossly and systematically mistaken about their witting experience.[12]

Meet also [edit]

  • Animal consciousness
  • Intersubjectivity
  • Qualia
  • Umwelt

References [edit]

  1. ^ a b Nagel, Thomas (10 March 2005). Honderich, Ted (ed.). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 637. ISBN978-0-xix-103747-four.
  2. ^ Nagel, Thomas (1974). "What Is Information technology Similar to Be a Bat?". The Philosophical Review. 83 (4): 435–450. doi:10.2307/2183914. JSTOR 2183914.
  3. ^ Levine, Joseph (2010). Review of Uriah Kriegel, Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (3).
  4. ^ a b c Dennett, Daniel C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Chocolate-brown and Visitor.
  5. ^ Wimsatt, William C (1976). Reductionism, Levels of Organization, and the Mind-Body Problem. Springer US. pp. 205–267. ISBN978-1-4684-2198-9.
  6. ^ "Qualia | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy". www.iep.utm.edu . Retrieved 2015-06-01 .
  7. ^ De Preester, Helena (2007). "The deep actual origins of the subjective perspective: Models and their bug". Consciousness and Cognition. 16 (3): 604–618. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2007.05.002.
  8. ^ Bickle, John; Mandik, Peter; Landreth, Anthony. "The Philosophy of Neuroscience". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford. Retrieved 2 September 2020. Kathleen Akins (1993a) delved deeper into existing cognition of bat physiology and reports much that is pertinent to Nagel's question. She argued that many of the questions nearly bat subjective experience that we nonetheless consider open hinge on questions that remain unanswered about neuroscientific details. One example of the latter is the function of various cortical action profiles in the active bat.
  9. ^ Akins, Kathleen (1993). "What is it Like to be Irksome and Myopic". In Dahlbom, Bo (ed.). Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind (PDF). Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. p. 125-160. ISBN0-631-18549-6.
  10. ^ Hacker, P.Thousand.S. (2002). "Is at that place anything it is like to be a bat?" (pdf). Philosophy. 77: 157–174. doi:10.1017/s0031819102000220.
  11. ^ Hacker, P.One thousand.Due south. (2012). "The Sorry and Sorry History of Consciousness: being, amongst other things, a challenge to the "consciousness-studies community"" (pdf). Royal Establish of Philosophy. supplementary volume 70.
  12. ^ Schwitzgebel, Eric; Gordon, Michael S. (2000). "How Well Do Nosotros Know Our Own Conscious Feel?: The Example of Human Echolocation". Philosophical Topics. 28 (two): 235–246.

Further reading [edit]

  • "What is it like to be a bat?". Philosophical Review. LXXXIII (4): 435–450. October 1974. doi:x.2307/2183914.
  • Hacker, P.Yard.Due south. (2002). "Is there anything it is similar to exist a bat?" (pdf). Philosophy. 77: 157–174. doi:10.1017/s0031819102000220.
  • Schwitzgebel, Eric (2020-12-23). "Is There Something It'southward Like to Be a Garden Snail?" (PDF). {{cite spider web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)

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Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Is_It_Like_to_Be_a_Bat%3F